妇女权利在民权运动创造的权利意识的氛围下突显出来。在有关妇女权利的争议中,博格法院（最高法院的首席大法官叫博格，故称）一般坚持法律面前人人平等的传统概念。 为回应反对性别歧视的公众态度和立法动议的变化，最高法院，如果没有决定性地损坏、至少是严重削弱了性别分类的原则，这一原则长期以来是联邦和州[注: 地理位置 和州　　汉置历阳县，晋置历阳郡，北齐以两国通和置和州，一说梁王僧辩迎贞阳侯于此，更名和州，隋复改为历阳郡，唐曰入州宋曰和州历阳郡，]支持剥夺妇女平等权利的法律基础。为把握这一发展过程的各个方面，简短地回顾该时期以前妇女的宪政地位有助于我们的理解。

Despite significant steps toward the emancipation of women resulting from such measures as the married women’s property acts, nineteenth-century state law, reflecting the male-dominated social consensus, consigned women to an inferior status in public life and in the world of private household and domestic relations. Women were generally excluded from voting, office holding, and jury services, denied educational and professional opportunities available to men, and in numerous ways defined as the subordinate partner in the marriage relationship. Nor did the Fourteenth Amendment, which temporarily raised feminist hopes of a major advance toward legal and political equality， alter this pattern of discrimination.  Two notable constitutional cases of the Reconstruction era made this fact clear.

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